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AN EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS OF OUTWARD FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT: THE CASE OF GREECE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the literature, there is only a limited amount of studies that investigates the effect of multinationality on 
shareholder’s wealth. Furthermore, their findings are contradictory.  Some of these papers support that 
there is a strong positive effect of international expansion, through Foreign Direct Investment FDI, on 
shareholder’s value (Errunza and Senbet, 1981; Black and Rose, 1991).  In this line of argument, seminal 
is the work of Doukas and Travlos (1988) who estimated the importance of factors, such as location, 
degree of multinationality and sectoral relatedness on the stock price returns of US firms involved in 
international acquisitions.  Their results indicated that geographical expansion to developing markets is 
related to higher returns.  This outcome is also verified in a recent work by Pantzalis (2001). Work by 
Conn and Connell (1990) and Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) concluded that FDI through acquisitions is a 
more profitable business than domestic acquisitions.  
Equally, there is strong evidence that FDI has no effect on shareholder’s wealth.  Jaquillat and Solnik 
(1978) confirmed that multinationals are a poor substitute to international portfolio diversification.  
Brewer (1981) and Fatemi  (1984) showed that there is little difference  (which is not statistically 
significant) between the stock returns of US based Multinational Enterprises  (MNEs)  and Domestic 
Enterprises  (DMEs). 
This paper expands the existing literature in two significant ways:  Firstly, by applying the event study 
methodology it provides detailed evidence on the value generating effect of different modes of FDI entry. 
Secondly, this is the first paper to empirically evaluate the impact of FDI on the stock returns of Greek 
firms participating in the Athens Stock Exchange  (ASE). Why then Greece? Greece is, in our view, a 
typical example of how a small, peripheral economy upgraded its regional role through outward FDI. This 
itself constitutes an important step in our understanding of the emerging patterns of outward FDI from 
small peripheral economies in particular in the context of an expanded European Union  (EU). Greece has 
been until very recently a recipient  (and not a very successful) of inward FDI.  
On the other hand outward FDI has been increasing rapidly.  According to UNCTAD’s (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development) World Investment Report (2003) Inward FDI in Greece was just 
0,6% of its Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF), whilst the Outward FDI was 2,1% of GFCF. More 
precisely, the opening up of Eastern European markets, in the early 1990s, offered Greek industry a 
dynamic alternative to revive and/or to augment profits. Statistical sources clearly show the importance of 
Greece as a key investor mainly in its neighbouring South-European countries. Indicative are the cases of 
Bulgaria where Greece is the top investor followed by Germany and Italy  (BFIA, 2002); Albania, where 
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it was the second largest investor  (after Italy) at the end of 2001; FYROM where it was the top investor 
followed by Cyprus and Germany  (end of 2000); Yugoslavia where it was the third largest investor after 
the Netherlands and Germany  (for the period 1996-98) and finally Romania where Greece was the 12
th 
largest investor at the end of 2001  (WIIW, 2002). 
At the same time, ASE provided investors with a key source of generating funds to finance their 
expansion strategies. Is no coincidence then, that leading Greek firms participating in ASE, domestic and 
subsidiaries of foreign multinational enterprises  (MNEs ), such as «3E»  (a Coca- Cola soft drinks 
subsidiary), «DELTA»  (dairy products, partner of DANONE), «INTRACOM» (telecommunications, a 
partner of Siemens), «COSMOTE»  (telecommunications), «CHIPITA»  (a PepsiCo food subsidiary) and 
many others started investing abroad. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows:  Next section provides the conceptual background and the 
methodology applied for the analysis.  Section 3 provides a solid description of the sample, while section 
4 focuses on the results from the event study methodology and the cross-sectional model.  Finally, in 
section 5 we conclude. 
 
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY 
Greek outward FDI is analysed in two stages: At a first stage we determine the abnormal returns generated 
by an investment decision, either foreign or domestic  (here applied as a benchmark) and then at a second 
stage we estimate which parameters affect the size and direction  (sign) of abnormal returns. 
Understanding FDI requires an in depth analysis of a set of factors. Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (known 
mostly as Ownership-Location-Internalisation  (OLI)  paradigm,  Dunning 1977; 1988; 1993)  has also 
emphasised that the returns to FDI, and hence FDI itself, can be explained by the competitive-ownership 
advantages of firms  (O), indicating who is going to produce abroad «and for that matter, other forms of 
international activity»  (Dunning, 1993, p.142), by locational factors  (L)   «influencing the where to 
produce»  (p.143) and by the internalisation factor  (I)  that «addresses the question of why firms engage 
in FDI rather than license foreign firms to use their proprietary assets»  (p. 145).  Dunning’s OLI provides 
the background for understanding and evaluating a country’s growth through FDI.  Thus, in a revised 
version of the Investment Development Path   (IDP) theory Dunning and Narula  (1996) identify five main 
stages of development at a country level.  These stages are distinguished by the different growth rates in 
the stocks of inward and outward investments that eventually determine the net outward investment  
(NOI) position of a country1.   
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Thus, OLI advantages act both as an initiating signal as well as the mechanism of the accomplishment of 
an FDI project.  The emerging question is then, the specification of goals, which a firm desires to pursue 
when becoming an MNE.  
On one hand, neo-classical theory asserts that profit maximization is the sole and ultimate goal of firms 
and consequently in a corporation is reflected in the welfare of owners/shareholders.  On the other hand, 
managerial theories are focusing in the interest of managers  (see Shleifer A., and Vishny, R.W.  (1997) 
for a survey on the relevant literature).   
In this paper we assume that the primary goal of a firm, undertaking FDI, is to maximise shareholders’ 
welfare.  More formally we identify shareholders’ interest with abnormal return, which in turn is then 
defined as the actual ex post return of a security minus the normal return. Normal return is the return that 
would have been expected if a specific event, in our case an FDI announcement, had not occurred.  It is 
important here to make a clarification.  By using abnormal returns we directly measure the impact of the 
decision to invest abroad on shareholder welfare.  Application of Tobin’s Q, or other measures on firm 
return including, Return on Equity, Return on Sales, or Return on Assets, evaluate the effect of 
international expansion on the overall performance of the firm. (Hitt et al. (1997), Tallman and Li (1996), 
Christophe (1997)).  Taking the analysis a step further, financial theory relates the fundamental value of 
the price of the stock of a firm, in the absence of bubbles in the stock market, with the present value of 
future dividends.  We also know that a firm has to equalize its sources of funds with its uses at each time 
period.  There are two major sources of funds; the issuing of new equity and cash flows, and two major 
uses; dividends and new investment
2
.  We assume that «growth» of a firm (g) comes only from new 
investment (i), irrespectively of the type of investment, i.e. new plants, research & development projects 
etc. (see Kumar et al., 2001 and Klette and Griliches, 1999). 
t tg  = f (i )    (1.1) 
where t=time  
Consequently, unexpected stock -price adjustments could then be either due to changes in the market –
required rate of return  (rt) or in the investment rate of return  (it). The announcement of a new investment 
project can influence both these rates in two ways: Firstly, rt is related to a stock specific risk, which can 
be affected by a new investment project.  Secondly, it  t, where i is the new undertaken investment and 
t is the portfolio of the different investment projects already undertaken by the firm (for a detailed 
mathematical model see Copeland and Weston, 1988, p.546-547). 
These two effects may result in either positive or negative abnormal returns  (Agmon and Lessard, 1977).  
Hence, the hypothesis put forth will then be that abnormal returns, generated by new investment 
announcements, are statistically different from zero: 
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*
0 : 0itH    (1.2) 
Where *it  is the estimated abnormal return of a stock i in time t. 
In order to estimate the abnormal returns we apply the event study methodology as firstly introduced by 
Ball and Brown  (1968) and Fama et al. (1969). We feel that event study is the most appropriate method 
of estimation as « methodologies based on the OLS market model and using standard parametric tests are 
well specified under a variety of conditions»  (Brown and Warner, 1985).  The excess expected stock 
returns are then calculated with the use of a market model: 
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Then the abnormal returns are estimated by applying the following equation
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a  are the estimated coefficient, using Ordinary Least Squares  (OLS), of a market 
model for an estimation window one year before the announcement date in a weekly basis
4,5
. 
The estimation and the event windows are illustrated in Figure 1 and are determined as follows:  We 
define tj
i







-t0 is the length of the estimation window, in this study 52 weeks, and the event window length 
is 1, i.e. one week. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
At the second stage of this analysis, we define a set of specific factors stressed by the OLI paradigm.  The 
application of the OLI framework will allow us  to discern differences in the magnitude and direction of 
abnormal returns generated by an FDI announcement.  To make things even more comprehensible we use 
as a benchmark domestic investment announcements. We then assume that OLI factors not only vary per 
individual investment but also the spectrum of OLI factors should lead to a non-negative, non-zero sum, 
which should maximise returns in order to engage in  FDI. This is in the line with the notion that OLI 
advantages are resources able to generate income (Dunning, 1993, p. 77).  At the same time and although 
other forms of international expansion, such as   trade, require the existence of L and to some extent O 
advantages it is clear that for a firm to get involve in FDI it is that the combination of  these advantages 
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must lead to maximisation of wealth compared to other alternative means of foreign market entry.  Thus, 
as Dunning suggests  ( p. 79),  there is some sort of sequence in the decision to engage  in FDI and 
therefore certain conditions must be satisfied.  This sequence determines the choice of foreign market 
entry, e.g. trade versus FDI , where actually the firm decides to internalise or not according to the 
“quality” of its O advantages.  The next three conditions should then hold: 
[ ( , , )] [ ( , , )]t t t t t t t ti f O L I g O L I    (1.5) 
( , , ) 0
i
O L I   (1.6) 
( , , ) max( )
i
O L I returns  (1.7) 
 
As analysed previously, estimated abnormal returns directly measure the value an  FDI  announcement 
generates to investors.  In order to test for the above conditions we relate abnormal returns to a set of Oi, 
Li,Ii characteristics.  It is the configuration of these characteristics that distinguishes between different 
forms of strategic response to market opportunities as quantified by equation 1.7. 
The governing hypotheses, for each of the variables tested in this analysis, are then formed as follows:  
CN is a concentration index that represents the stock percentage held by shareholders possessing more 
that 10% of the investing company, i.e. the company initiating the investment decision. According to 
Dunning (1993) we can distinguish two types of O advantages; advantages that have to do with the 
possession of intangible assets and O advantages that derive from the ability of a firm to minimise the 
costs of international transactions, i.e. “ transaction cost minimising advantages” (p. 80). In our case, CN 
reflects a firm’s “organisational system” and indeed underlines that a particular ownership structure 
exposes diverse attitudes towards risk appraisal and consequently different strategic responses towards 
such risks (Dunning, 1993, p. 76).   Data for each individual company can be found in the ASE daily 
Report.  We expect a negative relationship with the dependent variable, as it would suggest risk aversion 
of the principal shareholders towards new investment projects  (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976    and 
Morck and Yeung, 1991 for an extension of this argument by involving and analysing top management 
interests). 
LOC is a dummy representing recipient countries, taking the value of 1 for low income, 2 for lower-
middle income, 3 for upper-middle and 4 for high- income countries.  Greece is classified as an upper 
middle-income country.  Data were derived from the Annual report of the World Bank  (1999). We 
anticipate a negative sign, as higher risk economies, i.e. developing countries, would be associated with 
higher returns. When it comes to locational factors, Doukas and Travlos  (1988) used a country dummy 
capturing the development stage of the host country and Chongsithiphol and Schwarz  (1994) related 
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locational factors like language, cultural context and development with the abnormal return generated by a 
cross-border acquisition. 
TA stands for the logarithm of total assets of the investing firm and it is used as a measurement of size.  
Data were extracted from the firms’ annual reports.  Size is an obvious  “transaction cost minimising O 
advantage (Dunning, 1993, Table 4.1. p. 81) which however is transformed into an I advantage as it 
depicts the continuous internalization of previously external markets under common governance and 
management (Dunning, 1993, p. 79).  Empirically, size tends to favour multinationality  (Horst, 1972) and 
we thus expect a positive relationship between AR and TA.  Buckley and Pearce  (1979) emphasise the 
role of size, arguing that large firms tend to service foreign markets through FDI rather than trade. Studies 
that have tested firm-level characteristics include that of Juhl  (1979) and Grubaugh  (1987) who also 
found that size favoured multinationality. However, Hoesch  (1998) in a study on German investment in 
Central Eastern Europe (CEE) found that it is small German firms in employment terms that tend to 
penetrate through FDI CEE markets instead of other developed European markets.  
MNE is a dummy taking the value of 1 when the firm is part of an MNE network and 0 when a firm is 
domestic.  Data were derived from the ASE Daily report and the companies’ annual reports.  We 
hypothesize for a positive relationship between MNE and AR. Past experience on foreign investment and 
the economics of the multinational network should contribute to higher returns as these returns express 
the confidence of the market towards FDI initiated by already established MNEs.  This argument is also 
developed by Meyer (2001) who asserts the positive impact of prior global and /or regional experience on 
a firm’s expansion. 
PART measures the ownership share of the new investment.  Data were obtained from the ASE Daily 
Report.  PART, is an approximation of internalisation advantages.  The investing firm prefers to exploit 
the advantages of a new FDI project through ownership than through the external market, e.g. licensing or 
trade.  In between there are different degrees of ownership, and as Buckley and Ghauri state “In terms of 
internalisation theory, internal markets become “open” rather than “closed” (2004, p.5)”.  They further 
elaborate their argument by analysing the creation of networks and the role of joint –ventures and they 
conclude: “The early phase of a joint venture provides important information that could not be obtained 
through investigation before the venture began.  It affords an opportunity later on to buy more fully into a 
successful venture, an opportunity that is not available to those that have not taken any stake.  It therefore 
provides greater flexibility than does either outright ownership or an alternative involving no equity 
stake” (p. 6). Building on the previous statement we argue that  the greater the ownership share in a new 
investment would suggest that the firm wants to keep closer control and therefore secure its advantages 
from information leaking to others.  On the other hand, minority ownership in the new investment might 
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signify risk aversion and thus indicating a negative relationship between PART and AR. A 
complementary to this argument idea on political or cultural risk connotation between the investor and the 
«target» project is also developed by Hennart and Larimo  (1998).  
SECT is a dummy representing the industrial sector of the parent company.  It takes the value of 1 for 
labour-intensive industries and 0 for capital-intensive sectors6.  Jeon  (1992) noted that Korean firms in 
Heckscher-Ohlin type of industries tend to pursue FDI in LDCs.  He also confirmed his hypothesis that as 
wage costs rise in labor-intensive industries there is an incentive to take advantage of cheaper labor costs 
in LDCs through FDI. We would predict a negative sign for low-technology sectors flows as high-
technology sectors usually generate higher returns  (Ozawa, 1994). 
DIV is a dummy taking the value of 1 when the new investment denotes vertical integration and 0 when it 
presents horizontal integration.  Following Caves  (1996), we can distinguish the horizontal MNE whose 
subsidiaries produce the same range of products as the parent  (similar to the multidomestic strategy 
defined by Porter, 1986), the vertically integrated, which is either related to the extractive MNEs  
(backward vertically -resource based) (Dunning & Pearce, 1988) or the more articulated type that 
internalises its markets for inputs such as cheap labour. Horizontal integration is strongly related to 
market-seeking strategies whilst vertical integration to resource-seeking strategies  (Dunning, 1993). Data 
for this variable were collected from the Annual Reports of the firms participating in our sample.  When 
the undertaken investment is in the same 2-digit SIC sector with the investing firm then we define this as 
horizontal integration.  No prediction is made regarding the sign of this variable as both strategies, 
although different, can lead to return maximisation. 
Finally, we estimate the following function. 
( , , , , , , )iAR f CN LOC TA MNE PART SECT DIV
      
  (1.7) 
expressed in the succeeding linear approximation, 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7i iAR CN LOC TA MNE PART SECT DIV e                 (1.8) 
where ei is the error term having the usual statistical properties because the investment announcements do 
not overlap  (White 1980). To estimate regression (1.8) we apply OLS with robust standard errors. 
 
SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
It has already been stated that as event we consider, any formal investment announcement of the firm in 
the Daily Report of the ASE.  In this paper the full sample consists of 177 manufacturing firms enlisted in 
the ASE both domestic and subsidiaries of foreign MNEs.  For 54 of these companies an event or events  
(as defined above) were qualified for testing resulting to a total of 149 events.  Of these 149 events, 76 
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were FDI announcements and 73 domestic direct investment announcements
7
. It is customary to apply 
cumulative abnormal returns of approximately 2 days before and after the formal announcement of the 
event in order to accommodate for information leakages.  (See Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, pp. 151 
(1997) and Morse (1984)). For this reason, the estimation window for our market model is calculated on a 
weekly basis before the official date of the announcement. As market portfolio was applied an equally 
weighted index of the 177 firms included in the sample. The employment of such an index was necessary 
as the ASE value weighted index contains a huge amount of stocks of non-manufacturing companies.  
This can potentially create more variation in the calculated abnormal returns.  As a robustness check 
however, we used the value-weighted index of ASE and the results remained unchanged
8
.  Furthermore, 
one could argue that the appropriate market portfolio for truly multinational firms is the world market 
portfolio.  We used two different specifications; a single index model with only the world market index9 
and a multi-index market model proposed by Agmon and Lessard (1977).  In the first case the explanatory 
power of the market model is very low and in the second case the adjusted-R
2
 is usually lower than that of 
the market model using the Greek index providing strong support for the use of the later in a single index 
market model.  The world market portfolio might be the right portfolio for the parent companies or 
multinational subsidiaries established in mature financial markets like the US or/ and the UK but not 
always for other subsidiaries and in particular  for subsidiaries located in peripheral European economies, 
such as Greece,  which have only recently emerged as outward investors.   In addition, the majority of 
Greek multinationals invest in the Balkan markets and not in developed markets. These developments 
suggest more flexible approaches and measurements which  should reflect the heterogeneity encountered 
in today’s  global investment scene.  Finally, the interest rate of the 3-month Treasury Bill of the Greek 
state is used as a benchmark for the risk-free return.  
 
Tables 1 to 4 provide an overview of the main characteristics of our sample. We draw our attention to the 
following: 
1. Food & Drink and Metals account for almost half of the events in foreign and domestic investments, 
whilst the two contingency tables reveal a statistically significant relation between time and mode of 
expansion and industry and mode of expansion. 
  
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
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2. More than half of Greek FDI is undertaken in the Balkans and Eastern Europe whilst on the other 
hand the investments in developed countries account for only 22,4 % of the sample.  The impact of the 
host-country is verified in the two contingency tables, which provide evidence firstly for the existence 
of a statistically significant relationship between the timing of the investment announcement and the 
sector of the investor and location respectively. In addition, the timing pattern shows a consistent 
increase of FDI announcements in more recent years.  Thus firms, either inexperienced in international 
markets or with limited mandates, turned their attention to Eastern Europe and mainly to the Balkan 
region apparently favoured by geographical proximity. In the mid-1990’s onwards Greek based 
investors after having acquired experience and knowledge of their neighbouring markets injected 
capital more confidently in these economies. This is compatible with the theory of internationalisation  
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; 1990).   
3. Acquisitions and joint ventures are the most commonly used entry modes. 
Insert Table 3 here 
4. Finally, firms involved in FDI are larger than those engaged in domestic investment in terms of assets 
and turnover. 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
RESULTS 
In this section we present the results of the two stages of econometric analysis. Results on the event study 
of abnormal returns (ARs) by mode of expansion are presented in table 5.  
Insert Table 5 here 
On average ARs are positive and statistically significant.  Foreign mergers and acquisitions generate a 
higher AR compared to the other modes of expansion followed by domestic mergers and acquisitions.  
This is contrary to what Ding and Sun (1997) found for another emerging market, the Singapore, where 
FDI expansion produces higher returns than joint ventures or acquisitions.  Our results seem to confirm 
Waheed’s (1992) results where non-FDI modes of expansion increase the value of shareholders.  On the 
other hand, greenfield investment  (both domestic and foreign) does not show any statistically significant 
AR. To further examine the different modes of expansion we checked for differences among industrial 
sectors (Table 6). We do observe that international expansion yields high ARs in sectors such as 
chemicals, informatics and metals. FDI in a low technology sector i.e. textiles, produces the contrary 
outcome. However, the performed t-tests on the mean difference of ARs for different modes of entry and 
industrial Sectors do not turn out statistically different.  Similar are the results in Harris and Ravenscraft 
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(1991), where a higher premium was found for investments in R&D intensive industries but the results are 
not statistically significantly different for foreign and domestic expansion. 
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
In addition to the previous test, we split our sample across time.  The two time periods were 1990-1996 
and 1997-1999.  The break point reflects the increased interest of Greek investors for the capital market, 
new government policies for investments and the accumulated expertise of Greek firms investing abroad. 
T-tests endorse the intertemporal stability of our results
10
. 
In summarizing the event study results it is evident that the decision to invest abroad creates a positive 
reaction from the market, which results in higher returns.  This strong positive relationship is also found 
in Errunza and Senbet (1981) and Black and Rose (1991).  Our study deviates from those that found no 
difference in international or domestic expansion, i.e. Brewer (1981) and Fatemi (1984).  Nevertheless, 
mode of entry does matter, as greenfield investment is the sole mode of entry that deteriorates the 
prospects of an FDI project.  At the same time the market shows its assurance in domestic investment as 
well, suggesting  (in our case) strong confidence on the potential of the Greek market.  Domestic 
investment should not then be viewed as the outcome of an isolated and independent decision process,  
i.e. of a process that does not take into account international developments, thus, factors influencing FDI 
could potentially affect local investment decisions as well but not necessarily encompassing  the same 
weight and impact. Consequently, it is important to point out that these two types of investment are not 
identical.     In table 7 we present the results of the complete cross-section model and the two sub-samples 
by types of expansion, i.e. domestic expansion sample  (DES) and foreign expansion sample  (FES).  
Another possible breaking up of the sample is between domestic firms and multinationals.  Although it is 
beyond the scope of this study, the results can be found in Appendix 4.  The dependent variable is thus the 
abnormal return generated by the investment decision.  
 The result of the Ramsey -RESET test for omitted variables shows that our models are well specified and 
secondly the reported F-test supports that these two strategies are different (the null hypothesis that the 
two models are the same is rejected). 
 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
As it can be seen in Table 7 the overall performance of our models is also satisfactory in terms of 
Adjusted R
2 
and F-statistic.  Moreover, the values of both the Mean Variance Inflation Factor  (MVIF) 
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and Condition Index  (CI) indicate no signs of multicollinearity
11
.  Discussing the results for the full 
sample, we emphasize that ARs are positively influenced by LOC. This underlines-contrary to our 
hypothesis- that a well balanced mix of advanced location characteristics in developed economies suits 
better the long-term character of FDI.  This result is different from what Doukas and Travlos (1988) and 
Pantzalis (2001) found for US firms expanding abroad.  For these firms and their shareholders, greater 
benefits existed when expanding to less developed markets.  The negative sign on PART also supports a 
risk-avert strategy argument.  Similarly, the negative sign on SECT emphasizes that the market rewards 
investments in capital- intensive sectors. 
Looking closer at the two separate cross-section sub-samples, we see that FDI and domestic direct 
investment are indeed two different strategies. The positive sign for MNE in the FES model, suggests that 
a firm being a multinational is obviously considered, per se, as an advantage, which counterbalances the 
potential risks associated with FDI. This consequently turns the decision to invest abroad into a value 
generating strategy.  The same does not hold apparently for domestic expansion.  Thus, the market reacts 
negatively when an MNE further expands in the local market, disapproving the lack of diversification in 
the portfolio of investment projects.  This argument is valid for firms coming from developed markets as 
well.  Doukas and Travlos (1988) found similar results for the international geographical diversification 
of firms.  
Regarding the rest of the explanatory variables, we notice that PART remains statistically significant  
(with a negative sign) in DES model, while SECT is negatively signed and statistically significant in FES 
model.  DIV gains statistical significance only in the FES model. The negative sign for DIV states that 
horizontal integration is associated with higher ARs.  A similar result is obtained by Markides and Ittner  
(1994) who apply in their analysis a «relatedness» factor, which suggests similar lines of business between 
the parent and the subsidiary.
12
  As a final remark, a plausible explanation for the statistical insignificance 
of the two firm level variables, i.e. CN and TA, is that these variables are not directly related to the 
investment decision itself, in the sense that they represent characteristics of the investing firm that are 
already identified and thus incorporated in the market valuation of the firm13.  In studies though, 
performed for developed markets, these variables usually are statistically significant, i.e. Morck and 
Yeung (1992).  Quoting Campbell, Lo, MacKinlay pp. 174 (1997), “One must be very careful in 
interpreting the results of the cross-sectional regression approach.  In many situations, the event-window 
abnormal return will be related to firm characteristics not only through the valuation effects of the event 
but also through a relation between the firm characteristics and the extent to which the event is 
anticipated.  This can happen when investors rationally use firm characteristics to forecast the likelihood 
of the event occurring.”  Moreover, similar evidence can be found in Malatesta and Thompson (1985) and 
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Lanen and Thompson (1988). 
In concluding this section, we firstly demonstrated that subsidiaries of foreign MNEs as well as, newly 
established Greek MNEs enlisted in the ASE succeeded in gaining investors’ confidence in their decision 
to invest abroad.  This offers, in particular to foreign subsidiaries, the potential to upgrade their presence 
in regional markets.  Extensive work by Pearce  (1992), Taggart and Hood  (1997), Hood, Young and Lal   
(1994), Young, Hood and Dunlop  (1988), Birkinshaw and Morrison  (1995) and Birkinshaw and Hood  
(2000) has provided a solid theoretical and applied framework for the understanding of the MNE group as 
a network of subsidiaries with evolving strategic priorities and roles. Secondly, the results of the cross-
section model clearly demonstrated that different factors explain the generation of ARs in the case of FDI 
and domestic investment respectively.  These results support the idiosyncratic nature of FDI sending a 
message to Greek investors that when FDI is linked to horizontal integration, developed countries and 
capital-intensive sectors then the more attractive the strategy is in terms of generating higher ARs.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper was twofold:  Firstly, to show whether FDI is considered as a return generating 
strategy to investors, and secondly to determine which factors determine the excess market value of firms 
investing abroad.  The analysis was focused on the experience of Greece based firms enlisted in ASE. 
Greece is among the small and peripheral countries of the OECD that have taken advantage of the 
opening up of the eastern European markets and have quickly emerged  (in less than a decade) as dynamic 
outward investors.  This event in itself constitutes a very important development in the analysis of 
outward FDI as we witness how -primarily almost exclusively- recipient FDI host-countries are turning 
into outward investors.   The growth implications of such evolution are immense for both Greece as well 
as the host-countries of outward Greek FDI.  
The event study results showed that outward FDI does generate excess market value to investors.     In the 
case of Greece, the cross-section analysis revealed that a successful outward FDI project should be located 
in developed countries, performed in a capital-intensive sector and should be linked to horizontal 
integration. At the same time our results strongly suggested that domestic investment couldn’t be viewed 
as the outcome of an isolated decision process.  In our case Greece is an advance OECD economy, well 
integrated into the European economy and thus investing in Greece does create excess value to investing 
firms.  An interesting implication of this analysis is the emerging potential of foreign subsidiaries located 
in Greece to upgrade their roles into more sophisticated regional representatives of their respective 
groups.  Future research should look into this matter more closely. Finally, comparisons with other 
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Table 1: Contingency Table of Time and Mode of Expansion 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
Foreign Expansion 0 0 3 1 6 9 10 9 26 12 76 
  0,0   0,5   3,6   6,1   5,1   6,6   7,1   8,7   21,9   16,3   
Domestic Expansion 0 1 4 11 4 4 4 8 17 20 73 
  0,0   0,5   3,4   5,9   4,9   6,4   6,9   8,3   21,1   15,7   
Total 0 1 7 12 10 13 14 17 43 32 149 
Chi-Square  X
2
 (9) = 18.26* 
Expected Values in parenthesis 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
**   Significant at 5% level. 
*     Significant at 10% level. 
 
 
Table 2: Contingency Table of Sector Participation and Mode of Expansion 
 Foreign Expansion Domestic Expansion Total 
Food & Drink 23 15 38 
Expected Value  19,4   18,6   
Metals 13 19 32 
Expected Value  16,3   15,7   
Pharmaceutical & Cosmetics 5 8 13 
Expected Value  6,6   6,4   
Chemicals 5 4 9 
Expected Value  4,6   4,4   
Packaging 7 0 7 
Expected Value  3,6   3,4   
Textiles 6 6 12 
Expected Value  6,1   5,9   
Flour Mills 6 5 11 
Expected Value  5,6   5,4   
Construction Materials 5 2 7 
Expected Value  3,6   3,4   
Holding 2 5 7 
Expected Value  3,6   3,4   
Informatics 2 8 10 
Expected Value  5,1   4,9   
Various 2 1 3 
Expected Value  1,5   1,5   
Total 76 73 149 
Chi-Square  X
2
 (10) = 17.15* 
Expected Values in parenthesis 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
**   Significant at 5% level. 
*     Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 3: Analysis of the Sample by Host Region and Entry Mode 
Analysis of the sample by Host Region 
Host Regions Number of Firms Percentage 
E.U. Countries 11 14.47% 
Total of Developed 17 22.37% 
Balkans 40 52.63% 
Total of Developing 59 77.63% 
Total 76 100.00% 
Analysis of the sample by Entry Mode 
Type of Investment Number of Observations Percentage 
Acquisition 31 40.79% 
Greenfield Investment 18 23.68% 
Joint Venture 25 32.89% 
Other 2 2.63% 
Total 76 100.00% 
 
 
Table 4: Firm Characteristics according to their Investment Activity 
 Mean St. Dev Maximum Minimum 
Domestic Expansion         
Concentration 42.189% 26.559% 90.810% 0.000% 
Participation 64.359% 33.390% 100.000% 5.000% 
Total Assets* 103.69 91.66 361.26 6.63 
Turnover* 98.19 94.59 421.72 0.73 
Foreign Expansion         
Concentration 53.913% 23.836% 83.170% 0.000% 
Participation 67.368% 24.076% 100.000% 10.000% 
Total Assets* 174.97 252.36 1684.52 10.84 
Turnover* 166.32 232.46 1239.62 7.10 
Total Sample         
Concentration 48.169% 25.800% 90.810% 0.000% 
Participation 65.894% 28.955% 100.000% 5.000% 
Total Assets* 140.05 194.01 1684.52 6.63 
Turnover* 132.94 181.40 1239.62 0.73 
*In Millions of Euros.
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Table 5: Abnormal Returns by Mode of Expansion 
  Average AR St. Dev. Maximum Minimum N t-stat 
 Mode of Expansion            
1 Domestic Expansion Total  3.915% 0.113 45.367% -18.640% 73 2.970*** 
1a Domestic 
Mergers&Acquisitions 
3.982% 0.111 45.367% -18.640% 69 2.905*** 
1b Domestic Greenfield 
Investments 
2.761% 0.164 25.799% -12.248% 4 0.337 
2 International Expansion 
Total  
3.430% 0.088 24.071% -15.864% 76 3.391*** 
2a International 
Mergers&Acquisitions 
4.034% 0.089 24.071% -13.555% 58 3.467*** 
2b International Greenfield 
Investments 
1.486% 0.086 18.813% -15.864% 18 0.730 
 Total Sample 3.668% 0.100573 45.367% -18.640% 149 4.451*** 
t-tests on the difference of means  
1 Domestic Expansion vs. International Expansion 0.2930 
2 Domestic M&A vs. International M&A -0.0287 
3 Domestic Greenfield vs. International Greenfield 0.2270 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
**   Significant at 5% level. 
*     Significant at 10% level. 
 







Chemicals 12.86%*** -3.90%*** 3.441*** 
Construction Materials 1.24%* 4.40%*** -0.404 
Flour Mills -0.41% -0.01% -0.079 
Food & Drink 2.41%** 0.72% 0.890 
Holding 3.65%*** 2.22%** 0.165 
Informatics 8.65%*** 5.40%*** 0.363 
Metals 6.18%*** 7.21%*** -0.197 
Pharmaceuticals & Cosmetics 2.71%** 3.12%*** -0.128 
Textiles -1.21%*         10.17%*** -1.461* 
Standard Errors and number of observations where withheld for simplicity of the table. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
**   Significant at 5% level. 
*     Significant at 10% level.
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Table 7: Estimation Results of the Cross-Sectional Model. 
 
 Full Sample Domestic Expansion Foreign Expansion 
Intercept 0.098 0.085 0.074 
 ( 0.989)  (0.554)  (0.540)  
CN -0.025 -0.050 -0.015 
  (-0.774)   (-1.011)   (-0.343)  
LOC 0.019**  0.032*** 
  (1.740)   (2.837) 
TA -0.004 0.001 -0.005 
  (-0.430)   (0.076)   (-0.416)  
MNE 0.008 -0.050** 0.058** 
  (0.399)  (-1.866)   (1.966)  
PART -0.060** -0.075* 0.002 
  (-1.914)   (-1.638)   (0.053) 
SECT -0.047*** -0.030 -0.036** 
  (-2.711)   (-1.17)   (-1.811)  
DIV 0.004 0.027 -0.036* 
  (0.234)   (0.986)   (-1.622)  
 
Obs. 149 73 76 
Adj. R
2
 8.608% 13.474% 21.638% 
F-stat 1.98* 1.713 2.76** 
Mean VIF 1.15 1.27 1.34 
Condition Number 1.6687 1.9532 2.0590 
Ramsey-RESET F-stat 
 H0: Model has no 
omitted variables  
1.16 1.27 1.03 
F-stat  H0: The two 
models are the same  
 1.83* 
OLS estimation with robust standard errors.  
t- statistics are in parenthesis 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
**   Significant at 5% level. 
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APPENDIX 1:  
Correlation Matrix of the variables 
 CN DIV LOC TA MNE PART SECT 
CN 1.0000        
DIV -0.0565 1.0000       
LOC 0.0359 0.2988** 1.0000      
TA 0.2406** 0.0457 -0.0622 1.0000     
MNE 0.0231 0.0472 -0.0830 0.3940** 1.0000    
PART 0.0837 -0.2608** -0.0423 -0.0585 -0.0587 1.0000   
SECT -0.1252 0.0927 0.0143 -0.0282 0.0389 -0.2097* 1.0000  
** Statistically significant at 1% 
*   Statistically Significant at 5% 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics 





CN 1.10 0.9119 1.5137 1.0000 0.0881 
LOC 1.12 0.8943 1.4904 1.0078 0.1057 
TA 1.28 0.7839 1.1747 1.1352 0.2161 
MNE 1.20 0.8328 0.8723 1.3173 0.1672 
PART 1.12 0.8898 0.7970 1.3781 0.1102 
SECT 1.06 0.9414 0.6084 1.5773 0.0586 
DIV 1.19 0.8405 0.5436 1.6687 0.1595 
Mean VIF       1.15 Condition Number                   1.6687 
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APPENDIX 2: Estimation of Abnormal  
Returns 
Under the H0 that the event has no impact on both the mean and the variance of the return of the 
stock i, the abnormal returns should follow (for a detailed analysis on the statistical properties of the 
abnormal returns see Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997, p.158-160). 
, ,
~ (0, )i i
j ji t i t
V   (2.1) 
 
In order to draw overall inferences for the event of interest, i.e. FDI or domestic expansion, the 
estimated abnormal returns are aggregated along two dimensions: 











   (2.2) 
 
Where j=1,2,…J are the events for each firm across time. 
 







   (2.3) 
 
The event windows do not overlap and so the covariances are set equal to zero.  The following test 
is constructed in order to answer the question of whether the abnormal returns found are statistically 
























APPENDIX 3: Sectoral Breakdown of Sample 
 
Table: Capital and Labour Intensive Sectors 
Capital Intensive Labour Intensive 
Chemicals Flour Mills 





Pharmaceuticals & Cosmetics  
Various  
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APPENDIX 4: Results for domestic and multinational firms. 
 
Table: Abnormal Returns by Type of Firm 
  Average AR St. Dev. Maximum Minimum N t-stat 
 Type of Firm            
1 Domestic Firms  3.602% 0.106 45.367% -18.640% 108 3.530*** 
2 Multinational Firms  3.839% 0.087 24.071% -8.031% 41 2.824*** 
 Total Sample 3.668% 0.101 45.367% -18.640% 149 4.451*** 
t-tests on the difference of means  
 Multinational Firms vs. Domestic Firms 0.1281 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
**   Significant at 5% level. 
*     Significant at 10% level. 
 
Table: Estimation Results of the Cross-Sectional Model. 
 
 Full Sample Domestic Firms Multinational Firms 
Intercept 0.098 0.071 0.023 
 ( 0.989)  (0.122) (0.175) 
CN -0.025 -0.049 0.047 
  (-0.774)  (0.038) (0.052) 
LOC 0.019** 0.008 0.041*** 
  (1.740) (0.014) (0.015) 
TA -0.004 0.002 -0.007 
  (-0.430)  (0.011) (0.013) 
MNE 0.008   
  (0.399)   
PART -0.060** -0.074** 0.042 
  (-1.914)  (0.035) (0.061) 
SECT -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.032 
  (-2.711)  (0.019) (0.022) 
DIV 0.004 0.018 -0.017 
  (0.234)  (0.021) (0.027) 
 
Obs. 149 108 41 
Adj. R
2
 8.608% 10.24% 24.10% 
F-stat 1.98* 1.83* 1.59 
Mean VIF 1.15 1.15 1.18 
Condition Number 1.6687 1.6994 1.7406 
Ramsey-RESET F-stat 
 H0: Model has no 
omitted variables  
1.16 0.70 3.18 
OLS estimation with robust standard errors.  
t- statistics are in parenthesis 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
**   Significant at 5% level. 




                                                 
 
1
 Greece could be classified as a stage three country. The key characteristics of this stage include the 
deterioration of comparative advantage in domestic labour intensive industries increase in domestic 
wages exceeding productivity and the advent of outward investment in stage one and stage two 
countries, which possess cheap labour and/or natural resources. Outward investment in this case 
could be either market seeking or resource seeking which could eventually suggest the creation of 
export-processing zones in the host economy  (Dunning, 1993, p.57). 
2
 If a firm makes no investment will still receive cash flows each year but it will not «grow». 
3
 Pantzalis  (2001) in his conclusions acknowledges that an extension of his paper would have been 
to incorporate the application of « standard event study methodology where abnormal stock returns 
around successful acquisitions announcements are related to the location factors described in his 
work», p. 149 . 
4
 See Appendix 2 for a detailed analysis of the model and the statistical properties of abnormal 
returns. 
5
 The one year period is a fair time window to avoid changes in the beta factor of the market model 
which may be unrelated to the particular investment decision.  
6
 See Table  in Appendix 3 for the Sectoral breakdown. 
7
 At both stages of the analysis, we use abnormal returns generated by domestic investments as a 
benchmark.  
8
 These results are available upon request from the authors. 
9
 Two alternative world market indices were used.  The World Market Index provided from 
Datastream and the FTSE World market index.  As risk –free return we used the weekly yield of US 
Treasury bill. 
10
 Results for the time dimension are available upon request from the authors. 
11
 The full collinearity diagnostics accompanied by a correlation table of the variables are provided 
in the Appendix 1. 
12
 LOC is dropped in DES as all investment decisions concern Greece. 
13 Further to this point, the insignificant sign of size (expressed in TA) and the equal dispersion of 
firms’ value participating in the ASE, diffuses possible concerns regarding the efficient application 
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